



FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

2019 Main EXAMINATION

DEPARTMENT OF QUALITY AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

<u>PROGRAMME</u>	DIPLOMA MANAGEMENT SERVICES
<u>MODULE</u>	ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 3A
<u>CODE</u>	OEF33A3 / ORE33A3
<u>DATE</u>	01/06/2019
<u>DURATION</u>	3 HOURS
<u>TIME</u>	12H30 – 15H30
<u>TOTAL MARKS</u>	100

<u>EXAMINER</u>	MR H. NCUBE
<u>EXTERNAL MODERATOR</u>	MR J. MASHALA
<u>NUMBER OF PAGES</u>	4 PAGES

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES:

- Please answer all questions.
- Question papers must be handed in.
- This is a closed book assessment.
- Read the questions carefully and answer only what is asked.
- Number your answers clearly.
- Write neatly and legibly.
- Structure your answers by using appropriate headings and sub-headings.
- The general University of Johannesburg policies, procedures and rules pertaining to written assessments apply to this assessment.

ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 3A (ORE33A3/OEF33A3)

This paper consists of five [5] questions. Answer all the questions.

QUESTION 1

1.1 The core factors in creating and sustaining a positive culture, suggest the importance of history, expectations, groups, and relationships. Diagrammatically depict the core factors of a positive culture. (10)

1.2 Socialization processes are not only extremely important in shaping the individuals who enter an organization, they are also remarkably different from situation to situation. This variation reflects either lack of attention by management to an important process or the uniqueness of the process as related to organizations and individuals. Either explanation permits the suggestion that while uniqueness is apparent, some general principles can be implemented in effective socialization process. Discuss the five [5] activities of effective accommodation socialisation process. (10)

[20]

QUESTION 2

2.1 Personality is a stable set of characteristics and tendencies that determine commonalities and differences in people's behavior, with this in mind, formulate [4] four major forces influencing an individual's personality and further provide a practical example for each force. (10)

2.2 As a review of the literature indicates that over the past two decades, a consensus has emerged that five [5] dimensions or factors can be used to describe a substantial amount of human personality. Determine the [5] Dimensions of human personality. (10)

[20]

QUESTION 3

3. Outline the critiques of the following theories.

I. Herzberg's Theory (5)

II. Maslow's Hierarchy of needs. (5)

- III. Expectancy Theory (5)
- IV. Equity theory (5)

[20]

QUESTION 4

4.1 A significant amount of research has been done on what determines whether individuals are satisfied with rewards. Edward Lawler has summarized five [5] conclusions based on the behavioural science research literature. Outline five [5] conclusions of Edward Lawler. (10)

4.2 Researcher Alfie Kohn offers a compelling set of criticisms of performance-based rewards. He contends that rewards and punishments are just two sides of the same coin and the coin doesn't buy Very much. He suggests that managers must move beyond the use of rewards or punishments. Kohn raises some interesting arguments based on his review and interpretation of the research literature. List and explain the key five [5] points of his arguments. (10)

[20]

QUESTION 5

CASE STUDY: WHY DAIMLER – CHRYSLER NEVER GOT INTO GEAR
MAY 18, 2007

That Daimler can sell Chrysler as a more-or-less intact unit to a private equity firm tells you all you need to know about why the combination failed. The two organizations never were integrated into anything that approached a cohesive whole. The potential synergies that were used to justify the deal went unrealized.

Why did this happen? Because the two organizations really didn't like each other, and couldn't cooperate to the extent necessary to make the combination work. Serious efforts to integrate the operations of Daimler and Chrysler floundered on lack of trust clashes between the mid-market cowboys of Detroit and the high-end knights of Stuttgart.

The seeds of post-merger disintegration were sown early when it became obvious that a "merger of equals" was actually a takeover of Chrysler by Daimler. And there were unbridgeable differences in the cultures of the two organizations. As is too often the case in acquisitions, the synergies were all on the surface.

In theory, the Daimler-Chrysler combination should have yielded two very potent sources of competitive advantage. The first was a cohesive global brand architecture. Consider Toyota. Its brand structure is extremely clear and logical: Lexus for the high-end buyer,

Toyota for the middle-income family, and Scion for the hip young. The segmentation makes sense and the progressions between segments are natural ones. Young people find partners, have children, and buy minivans; people with money move up to luxury vehicles.

The second potential source of competitive advantage lay in creating a coherent platform strategy built on the economic logic of parts sharing. Because the cost of developing new vehicles is so great, car companies design “platforms” from which they create families of vehicles. They also try to share parts between platforms to drive economies of scale in manufacturing.

Realizing synergy in brand architecture and platform strategy would have required deep integration of Daimler and Chrysler. German engineers would have had to design cars using parts created by American engineers and vice versa. The management team would have had to develop a global brand strategy and associated logic of competitive positioning. None of this happened. They ran the two organizations as separate operations. When major shifts in the environment (rising gas prices and the move away from SUVs and trucks) kicked out the blocks from under Chrysler’s recovery, it was both necessary and possible for them to part.

Much of the fault for this debacle belongs to Daimler’s former chairman, Jergen Schrempp. Like many senior executives anxious to cement their legacies, he got caught up in late 90’s acquisition mania. Economists have estimated that between 1998 and 2001, large acquisitions cost the shareholders of acquiring firms \$397 billion. We can only wonder if the current surge in the urge to merge will yield a similarly bitter harvest.

[Michael D. Watkins](#) is a professor at [IMD](#), a cofounder of [Genesis Advisers](#), and the author of [The First 90 Days](#) and [Master Your Next Move](#) (Harvard Business Review Press).

5.1 Identify the major causes of the merger to fail? Discuss what you think were the five causes of the merger to fail. (10)

Open

5.2 Examine what managers can do to lessen the negative impact of failed mergers. (10)

[20]

Total: [100]

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